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THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: NEW
PARADIGM OR WOLF IN SHEEP'S
CLOTHING?
MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS*
Abstract: The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) is
currently negotiating with seven other countries to form a new trade
agreement called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP has the
potential to expand into a Free Trade Agreement of the Asia-Pacific
(FTAAP). At present there are several competing models for Asia-Pacific
economic integration that exclude the United States entirely. In such an
environment, the TPP presents the United States with a welcome oppor-
tunity, not only to participate, but also to take a leadership role in estab-
lishing the terms for a region-wide agreement. Nevertheless, the USTR
must make the TPP sufficiently attractive to other Asia-Pacific economies,
such that those countries will prefer the TPP over other integration mod-
els. This will require the USTR to partially diverge from its standard FTA
template and liberalize in new areas. Although doing so may be politically
challenging, it is the United States' best strategy if it wishes to solidify a
role for itself in an economically integrated Asia-Pacific.
INTRODUCTION
The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has
devoted significant resources to negotiating the United States' acces-
sion to a trade agreement known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP). Although these negotiations have captured the attention of U.S.
negotiators, and are well-known to the countries already participating
in the TPP, the TPP's existence is not otherwise well-known. As of mid-
2009, mentioning the TPP at international legal academic conferences
drew mainly blank looks. Correspondingly, there is a dearth of legal
scholarship on the TPP.1 Nevertheless, although the TPP has slid be-
neath the radar until this point, it should not be ignored any longer.
@ 2010, Meredith Kolsky Lewis.
* Senior Lecturer and Co-Director of the New Zealand Centre of International Eco-
nomic Law at the Victoria University of Wellington Law School. Visiting Professor, George-
town University Law Center 2010-11. meredith.lewis@vuw.ac.nz.
I This author is only aware of two other legal academic articles that discuss the TPP:
the first is an article that only mentions the TPP in a passing footnote, and the second is
this author's earlier article on the subject. See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Expanding the P-4
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The TPP is a new type of trade agreement. It does not fit into the
more common molds of bilateral free trade agreements or plurilateral
customs unions. Rather, the TPP represents an unprecedented free
trade agreement (FTA) comprising eight or more members, including
the United States, and has implications for regionalism-particularly in
the Pacific Rim-and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and for
the power dynamics between major trading blocs. The TPP has the po-
tential both to harmonize and to fragment. It reflects both a conver-
gence of economies seeking to form a broader alliance, and a diver-
gence from the multilateral trading system. The TPP has the potential
to create a new paradigm for trade agreements, to form the basis for a
Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), and to provide an alterna-
tive power center within Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 2
in ways that are distinct from the models that have been jockeying for
Trade Agreement into a Broader Trans-Pacific Partnership: Implications, Risks and Opportunities, 4
ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 401, 403 (2009); Yanning Yu, Trade Remedies:
The Impact on the Proposed Australia-China Free Trade Agreement, 18 MICH. ST.J. INT'L L. 267,
269 n.8 (2010). Most of the available commentary on the TPP is in electronic form and is
authored by economists, political scientists, think tanks, and NGOs. One exception to this
is a collection of works edited by ProfessorJane Kelsey of the University of Auckland Law
School. See generally No ORDINARY DEAL: UNMASKING FREE TRADE AND THE TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (Jane Kelsey ed., 2010). Additional information regarding the
TPP can be found on the TPP-dedicated website created by Professor Kelsey. SeeJane Kel-
sey, TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (TPP) (US-P4+), http://web.me.com/jane
kelsey/Trans-PacificPartnership_FTA/Welcome.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). Various
government websites also provide information regarding the precursor agreement to the
TPP and the current negotiations. See, e.g., Australia's Participation in Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship Agreement Negotiations, AuSTL. GOv'T DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, http://www.
dfat.gov.au/trade/fta/tpp/index.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010); Trans-Pacific Partnership,
OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/tpp (last visited Nov. 15, 2010);
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, N.Z. MINIsTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE,
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trtde-and-Economic-Relations/Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/
Trans-Pacific/index.php (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
2 Cf N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, THE TRANS-PACIFIC STRATEGIC Eco-
NOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 1, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-agreement/
transpacific/transPac-Factsheet-2MarO9.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) [hereinafter N.Z.
MFAT TPP FACTSHEET] (P-4 is generally regarded as "a state of the art modern free trade
agreement" that "could be seen as a model within the Asia-Pacific region"). APEC is an acro-
nym for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, sometimes referred to as four adjectives in
search of a noun. About APEC, ASIA-PAcIFic EcON. COOPERATION (Jan. 14, 2009),
http://www.apec.org/apec/about-apec.htmil. The twenty-one members of APEC are: Austra-
lia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Republic of the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Tai-
wan, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. Member Economies, AsIA-PACIFIC EcON. CooP-
ERATION (2010), http://www.apec.org/apec/member-economies.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2010).
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favor the past several years.3 Nevertheless, if the TPP is not negotiated
properly, these results are unlikely to materialize. At times, the United
States has appeared to approach the negotiations as if it were negotiat-
ing just another FTA according to the standard U.S. template. This tac-
tic is contrary to the United States' long-term interests, however, as it is
likely to result in an agreement that will not be sufficiently attractive to
convince other APEC economies to join en masse.
In short, the TPP has the potential to be an exceedingly important
agreement. This Article thus seeks to highlight what the TPP is, why it is
an agreement to watch, and what negotiating issues will affect whether
or not the agreement is truly groundbreaking or merely a repackaged
version of the United States' existing FTAs.
I. WHAT IS THE TPP?
The TPP is a trade agreement-currently under negotiation-that
has its roots in an existing agreement between Brunei, Chile, New Zea-
land, and Singapore.4 The goal of these original four TPP members was
not to form a union based on economic synergies among the current
partners, but rather to create a model agreement that could be ex-
panded to include additional members from both sides of the Pacific.5
This is the first non-customs union trade agreement with the avowed
purpose-and potential-of transforming into a large, plurilateral free
trade agreement.6
The United States is currently negotiating to join an expanded
version of the TPP, along with Australia, Peru, and Vietnam.7 An ex-
3 See Lewis, supra note 1, at 408. These include: an East Asian FTA comprising China,
Korea, and Japan; an ASEAN + 3 model, that would see the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) forming an FTA with China, Korea, and Japan; and an ASEAN + 6 mod-
el that would additionally include Australia, New Zealand, and India. Id.
Id. at 403.
5 Id.
6 See id. at 403, 404; N.Z. MFAT TPP FACTSHEET, supra note 2, at 1.
Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Ron Kirk Com-
ments on Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks (June 18, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/june/ustr-ron-kirk-comments-trans-pacific-partner
ship-talk. Malaysia has recently committed domestically to seek to join the TPP and is pres-
ently engaging in bilateral discussions with the other participating countries. See TPPMembers
Examine Proposals in Peru, Do Not Reach Final Agreements, 28 Inside U.S. Trade Online (Inside
Wash. Publishers) (Aug. 27, 2010), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-
Trade-08/27/2010/tpp-members-examine-proposals-in-peru-do-not-reach-final-agree-ments/
menu-id-710.htmi. Canada has also expressed interest in joining. See id. As of late August
2010, neither country has been invited to participate in the multilateral negotiating rounds.
See id. It is likely that this invitation will be extended more easily to Malaysia than to Canada,
due to Canada's current level of agricultural protection. See id.
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amination of the USTR's website reveals a significant amount of infor-
mation about the TPP. In fact, the USTR has set up a separate section
of its website specifically devoted to this negotiation.8 Although there is
a great deal of material on the USTR website, it does not provide a
complete picture of the origins and nature of this agreement.9
The USTR website explains that the TPP comprises eight coun-
tries-the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Chile,
Brunei, Peru, and Vietnam-that have recently decided to form a trade
agreement.10 The USTR suggests that the Obama administration be-
came interested in forming the TPP after the administration reviewed
its trade policy strategy in conjunction with members of Congress."
The USTR also suggests that the TPP is geared toward obtaining mar-
ket access for U.S. exports.12 Although not technically inaccurate, this
description of the TPP agreement, how it arose, and the USTR's expla-
nation of why the United States is seeking to join the TPP, is somewhat
misleading. The following section sets out a more comprehensive ex-
planation of the TPP, including why the United States may have elected
to participate in its expansion.
A. The Genesis of the TPP
The USTR website suggests the TPP is a new agreement that does
not have a precursor. This is not entirely accurate. As noted above, in
2005, four countries from different corners of the globe-Brunei, Chile,
New Zealand, and Singapore-entered into a unique and potentially
path-breaking free trade agreement called the Trans-Pacific Strategic
Economic Partnership Agreement.'3 This agreement was informally
I Trans-Paciic Partnership, supra note 1.
9 See id.
1o USTR FACT SHEET: Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTA-
TIVE (Nov. 2009), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/november/
ustr-fact-sheet-trans-pacific-partnership.
"1 See Trans-Pacific Partnership: Frequently Asked Questions, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/webfm-send/1711 (last visited Nov. 15, 2010);
USTR FACT SHEET: Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 10; see also Karl Ehlers, U.S. Trade
Representative's Office, Remarks at the American Society of International Law's 104th
Annual Meeting: International Law in a Time of Change, "Asian Economic Integration-
Reflecting or Reshaping Legal and Economic Realities?" (Pacific Rim Region Interest
Group Session) (Mar. 25, 2010) (attended by author) (suggesting that the Administra-
tion's interest was the result of a general review of U.S. trade policy).
12 See Ehlers, supra note 11; USTR FACT SHEET: Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 10.
1s See N.Z. MFAT TPP FACTsHEET, supra note 2, at 1.
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known as the Trans-Pacific SEP, the P4 Agreement, or just the P4.14
Since the United States joined negotiations, the agreement has become
more commonly referred to as the TPP.15
What is now known as the P4 Agreement began with negotiations
launched by Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore at the APEC leaders'
summit in 2002.16 These original negotiations contemplated an agree-
ment known as the Pacific Three Closer Economic Partnership (P3
CEP).' 7 Nevertheless, Brunei attended several negotiating rounds as an
observer, and ultimately joined the P4 Agreement as a "founding
member." 8 The P4 Agreement was signed by New Zealand, Chile, and
Singapore on July 18, 2005, and by Brunei on August 2, 2005, following
the conclusion of negotiations in June 2005.19 Following the passage of
implementing legislation, the P4 Agreement entered into force on dif-
fering dates in 2006 with regard to the various parties. 20
The P4 Agreement is the first multi-party free trade agreement
linking Asia, the Pacific, and Latin America.2' In addition to its geo-
graphic diversity, the P4 Agreement is interesting because of the com-
prehensiveness and depth of its coverage. Unlike most FTAs, the P4
Agreement provides for nearly total liberalization of all goods, including
agriculture.22 It calls for Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore to reduce
14 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 1; see History of the Trans-
Pacific SEP Agreement P4, N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/
Tade-and-Economic-Relatiors/Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/0-history.php
(last visited Nov. 15, 2010); SICE: Trade Policy Developments: Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,
ORG. OF AM. STATES FOREIGN TRADE INFO. Sys., http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CHL
Asia/CHL Asiae.ASP (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
1 See SICE: Trade Policy Developments: Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note 14.
To avoid confusion, in this article "P-4" will be used to refer to the agreement as originally
formed, whereas "TPP" will be used to refer to the agreement that the United States is
negotiating.
16 Lewis, supra note 1, at 403.
17 Id.
1a Id. at 403-04.
19 Id. at 404. At the same time, the parties signed a binding Environment Cooperation
Agreement and a binding Labour Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding. See id.
2 Id. Brunei only deposited an instrument of provisional application and the Agreement
has therefore provisionally applied to Brunei sinceJune 2006. Id.
21 Id.
2 Lewis, supra note 1, at 415. It is common for FTAs to exclude a significant percent-
age of agricultural products from their coverage. See id. at 415-16; see also Richard H.
Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 268 (2004) (noting frequent exclusion of agriculture from Euro-
pean Union FTAs); Anna Turinov, Free Trade Agreements in the World Trade Organization: The
Experience of East Asia and theJapan-Mexico Economic Partnership Agreement, 25 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 336, 347 (2008) (discussing Asian FTAs).
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tariffs to zero on all goods by 2017, and for Brunei to reduce tariffs to
zero on all but a handful of products. 23 The P-4 Agreement did not cov-
er financial services or investment, but provided that these areas would
be negotiated two years after the P-4 Agreement came into force.24
Those negotiations have substantially completed.25
Although the P-4 Agreement is comprehensive in its scope- par-
ticularly now that the financial services and investment negotiations
have taken place-its uniqueness is more attributable to its structure
than its content.26 First, although the participating countries are all
APEC members, the P-4 Agreement deliberately joins countries span-
ning the globe. It creates a strategic linkage that extends to the far cor-
ners of the Pacific, joining Latin America, South East Asia, and Oce-
ania.27 These countries were not motivated by improved access to each
other's markets; Singapore already provided duty-free access on all
goods except alcohol and tobacco, 28 and New Zealand maintains very
few tariffs.29 None of the countries has a particularly large economy or
population.30 Instead, the parties' intent was to form a high-standards
2 See N.Z. MINISTmY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, THE NEW ZEALAND-SINGAPORE-CHILE-
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM TRANS-PACIFIC STRATEGIC EcONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 22 (2005),
http://www.ifit.govtnz/downloads/trade-agreement/transpacific/-ans-pacificbooklepdf [here-
inafter N.Z. MFAT 2005 REPORT].
24 Id. at 47.
25 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 1.
26 Cf Henry Gao, The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement: High
Standard or Missed Opportunity? 4-6 (Nov. 2, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/mtg/con09_papers.htm [hereinafter Gao, Trans-
Pacific SEP] (noting the range of goods included in the P-4 Agreement); Trans-Pacific Stra-
tegic Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 1 (highlighting that financial services and
investment negotiations have occurred). Not everyone is convinced that the P-4 is truly a
"high-standards" agreement. See Henry Gao, A Scorecard for the P4: Full or Fail?, EAST ASIA
FORUM (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/12/02/a-scorecard-for-the-p4-
full-or-fail (arguing that the agreement could have phased out tariffs more quickly and
that its provisions on rules of origin, trade remedies, and services are more restrictive than
necessary).
27 See N.Z. MFAT 2005 REPORT, supra note 23, at 13.
28 See Gao, Trans-Pacific SEP, supra note 26, at 6.
9 Trade and the New Zealand Economy: New Zealand's Tanffs, N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFF. & TRADE (Oct. 2005), http://www.ifat.govt.nz/posts/pdf/paris-nztariffs.pdf.
3 World Development Indicators Database: Gross Domestic Product 2009, PPP, WORLD BANK
(Sept. 27, 2010) http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP_
PPP.pdf; World Development Indicators Database: Population 2009, WORLD BANK (Sept. 27,
2010) http://siteresources.worldban.tnorg/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/POP.pdf. Accord-
ing to World Bank statistics for 2009, New Zealand has a population of 4.3 million; Singapore
of 5 million; and Brunei of 400,000. Chile has the largest population within the P-4, at 17
million (all figures rounded). World Development Indicators Database: Population 2009, supra.
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agreement that could serve as a model for a broader APEC-wide
agreement, and to which other APEC members could accede."
To facilitate the P4 Agreement's potential to serve as an APEC-
wide model or template for an ultimate Free Trade Area of the Asia-
Pacific, the parties included an open accession provision in the P-4.32
The P-4 Agreement provides that it is open to accession "on terms to be
agreed among the [plarties, by any APEC [e]conomy or other
[sItate."33 In theory, FTAs without open accession provisions could be
expanded upon the agreement of all of the members. Nevertheless,
this does not tend to happen in practice. Indeed, even in the relatively
few FTAs that do contain open accession provisions, expansion rarely
occurs.34 Nonetheless, in the context of the P4 Agreement, the open
accession clause is important because the parties' goal from the begin-
ning was to expand the agreement.3 5 Therefore, the parties included
the provision in hopes that like-minded countries would consider join-
ing the agreement, propelling it towards a possible APEC-wide phe-
nomenon.
Interestingly, although the P-4 countries included an open acces-
sion provision so that other countries could accede to the P-4 Agree-
ment, it appears that TPP negotiations are not going to entail any new-
comers formally acceding to the P4 Agreement.36 At a conference
31 See N.Z. MFAT 2005 REPORT, supra note 23, at 13. In its official publication on the P4
Agreement, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) states that
"[b]ecause of the low barriers to trade between the partners to the Trans-Pacific SEP, a key
objective of the negotiations, from the start, was the potential strategic benefits." Id. at 12-13.
3 See Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement art. 20.6, Jul. 18-Aug. 2
2005, ORG. AMs. STATES, http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CHLAsia_e/mainAgreemt-e.pdf
(accessed through the Organization of American States' Foreign Trade Information Sys-
tem) [hereinafter Trans-Pacific Partnership].
33 Id. Open accession provisions are unusual but not unheard of. Meredith Kolsky Lewis,
The Prisoner's Dilemma Posed by Free Trade Agreements: Can Open Access Pmvisions Provide an Es-
cape? 11 CHI. J. INT L L. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 35) (on file with author). The
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) contains such a provision, as do a number
of FTAs among APEC members, including the Thailand-New Zealand FTA and the Thai-
land-Australia FTA. Thailand-New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, ThaL-
N.Z., art. 18.5, Apr. 19, 2005, available at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-agree-
ment/thailand/ thainzcep-december2004.pdf; Australia-Thailand Free Trade Agreement,
Austl.-Thai, art. 1905, July 5, 2004, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/
treaties/2005/2.html; North American Free Trade Agreement art. 2204, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec.
17, 1992, available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?x= 343&mtpilD= ALL.
3 Lewis, supra note 33, at 35.
3 See Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 32, pmbl. See generally Lewis, supra note 33
(providing a more detailed discussion of open accession provisions).
6 See Ann Capling, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, EAST ASIA FORUM (Nov. 23, 2009),
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/11/23/the-trans-pacific-partnership.
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session of the 2010 American Society of International Law Annual Meet-
ing, official Karl Ehler made clear that the United States was not acced-
ing to the P-4 Agreement, but rather that a new agreement was being
negotiated.37 This is consistent with reports from individuals familiar
with the negotiations.38 Nonetheless, the genesis of the TPP is clearly the
P-4 Agreement. In addition to the obvious fact that all the P-4 countries
are involved in the TPP negotiations, the P4 Agreement contains the
key ingredients that are being sought in the TPP: geographic diversity, a
high-standards agreement, and a model for expansion.39
B. The United States Joins the Party
Although the Obama administration presents the TPP as its idea-
derived after reviewing U.S. trade policy objectives-the United States'
substantive involvement actually dates back to the Bush administra-
tion.4 The two-year anniversary of the P-4 Agreement triggered the
beginning of the negotiations on investment and financial services. 41
The United States expressed interest in joining those negotiations, with
the ultimate intention of acceding to the P4 Agreement if terms could
be agreed upon.4 2 The P-4 Agreement member countries then entered
into preliminary negotiations with the United States in early 2008 that
were intended to lay the groundwork for the United States' ultimate
accession. 43 Shortly after these negotiations commenced, Australia and
Peru announced that they also intended to join the P-4 Agreement.
More recently, Vietnam was identified as an additional planned partici-
3 See Ehlers, supra note 11.
3 See, e.g., Trans-Pacific StrategicEconomicPartnershipAgrement, supra note 1.
3 SeeTrans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 32, pmbl., art. 1.1.
40 See Ann Capling, Multilateralising PTAs in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Comparison of
the ASEAN-Australia-NZ FTA and the P4 Agreement, at 8 (United Nations Econ. & Soc.
Comm'n for Asia & the Pacific, Conference Paper, Asia-Pacific Trade Economists' Confer-
ence, 2009), available at http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/mtg/2-2Ann%20Capling.pdf.
The United States apparently proposed the negotiation of an FTA with Australia, Chile,
New Zealand, and Singapore back in 1998, with the goal of sparking further trade liberali-
zation within APEC. See id. at 7. Although Australia, Chile, and the United States ultimately
did not pursue this idea, New Zealand and Singapore went on to negotiate a high-
standards bilateral FTA. See id.
41 See N.Z. MFAT 2005 REPORT, supra note 23, at 47.
42 See Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 1.
4 See Understanding the TPP-The Path to Expansion, N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. &
TRADE (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Trade-
Relationships-and-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/index.php#UnderstandingTPP.
34 [Vol. 34:27
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pant." Once the United States signaled its intention to join, the
agreement came to be called the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP.45
In September 2008, comprehensive negotiations for the United
States to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership were launched informally."6
The first round of formal negotiations was originally scheduled to
commence in March 2009, with Vietnam expected to join as an ob-
server, and Australia and Peru intending to participate.47 Nevertheless,
with the intervening change in U.S. administration, the first round of
negotiations was deferred until the Obama administration conducted a
general review of U.S. trade policy.48 Accordingly, although the Obama
administration decided to participate in the negotiations following a
review of its trade policy, the decision can be seen as an extension of
Bush administration trade policy.
C. Why Is the United States Pursuing the TPP?
Some scholars have commented that the USTR has not focused
significant energy on the VTO Doha Round of trade negotiations, but
instead has treated the TPP agreement as the "only game in town."49 Yet
it is not obvious why the United States has decided to pursue the TPP.
Although the USTR suggests that the TPP will expand market access
and is driven by purely economic considerations, this is at best only
true in an indirect sense. In reality, the TPP is more significant as a po-
tential Asia-Pacific agreement than as an agreement among the initial
eight countries.50
44 See id.
41 See SICE: Trade Policy Developments: Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note 14;
Understanding the TPP-The Path to Expansion, supra note 43.
46 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Trans-Pac. Partners and U.S. Launch
FTA Negotiations (Sept. 22, 2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/trans-pacific-partners-
and-united-states-launch-fta-negotiations.
47 U.S. Delays TPP Talks to Allow Obama Cabinet Members to Take Office, 27 Inside U.S. Trade
Online (Inside Wash. Publishers) (Feb. 27, 2009), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade-02/
27/2009/us-delays-tpp-talks-to-allow-obama-cabinet-members-to-take-office/menu-id-710.html.
48 Id.
4 See, e.g., Bernard K. Gordon, Obama's Visit to Indonesia and Australia and the TPP, EAST
ASIA FORUM (May 30, 2010), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/05/30/obamas-visit-to-
indonesia-and-australia-and-the-tpp/. Indeed it appears that the United States is making no
significant efforts to conclude the Doha Round any time soon. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer et
al., FIGURING OUT THE DOHA ROUND 7, 10-11 (Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ., 2010) available
at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/resere/dialogue-paperschotte.pdf.
5o See Myron Brilliant, Senior Vice President, Int'l Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
Oral Testimony to the Trade Police Staff Committee, Office of the United States Trade
Representative, 2 (Mar. 4, 2009). Brilliant notes:
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The United States' decision to join the TPP is not driven by the
market access potential within the current eight parties. Of the TPP
members or members-to-be, the United States already has FTAs with
Australia, Chile, Singapore, and Peru.5' Therefore, the United States
could only form new connections with Vietnam, New Zealand, and
Brunei. Vietnam is in some ways an attractive potential free trade
agreement partner for the United States, but Vietnam joined the talks
only after the United States had signaled its interest. Therefore, Viet-
nam is not driving the United States' involvement.52 New Zealand has
long expressed its interest in an FTA with the United States.53 Until the
While new export opportunities in the seven partners of the TPP negotiations
... may be relatively modest for U.S. companies, ... [i]f the TPP agreement
evolves gradually into the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, then the United
States has the potential to reach into economically significant markets that
previously have been closed off to us through bilateral negotiations.
Id.
5 See Free Trade Agreements, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., http://www.trade.gov/fta (last visited
Nov. 15, 2010). Indeed, among the eight countries currently negotiating the TPP, there are
so many existing free trade agreements that there are only eight bilateral combinations that
are not already covered by existing preferential arrangements: Australia-Peru; Brunei-
United States; Brunei-Peru; Chile-Vietnam; New Zealand-Peru; New Zealand-United States;
Peru-Vietnam; and Vietnam-United States. John Ravenhill, Extending the TPP: The Political
Economy of Multilateralization in Asia, at 25 (United Nations Econ. & Soc. Comm'n for Asia
& the Pacific, Conference Paper, Asia-Pacific Trade Economists' Conference, 2009), available
at http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/mtg/2-3John%20Ravenhill.pdf.
52 See generally Data Profile of Vietnam, WORLD BANK (2010), http://www.worldbank.org
(navigate to "Data" hyperlink; then navigate to "By Country"; then navigate to "Vietnam");
Vietnam, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/
countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/vietnam (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (reporting
that Vietnam has a relatively large population of approximately 86 million, and yet it is
only the United States' 45th largest goods market as of 2009). Further, entering a free
trade agreement that includes Vietnam as a partner would also cause some consternation
within the United States. Vietnamese shrimp and catfish exports have been the subject of
antidumping investigations and associated litigation within the United States, resulting in
the imposition of duties on these products. See generally Sungjoon Cho, A Dual Catastrophe
of Protectionism, 25 Nw. J. INT'L L. AND Bus. 315 (2005); Stephanie Showalter, The United
States and Rising Shrimp Imports from Asia and Central America: An Economic or Environmental
Issue, 29 VT. L. REv. 847 (2005); Joshua Startup, From Catfish to Shrimp: How Vietnam
Learned to Navigate the Waters of "Free Trade" as a Non-Market Economy, 9 IowA L. REv. 1963
(2005). The U.S. industries that filed these petitions are unlikely to be pleased by the
prospect of Vietnam's products obtaining improved market access to the United States in
the form of reduced-and perhaps ultimately removed-tariffs. See Cho, supra, at 315-17.
5 See United States of America: Country Information, N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF.
& TRADE, available at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/North-America/United-
States.php. MFAT publicly acknowledges that "[s]ecuring a free trade agreement negotia-
tion with the United States has been a key New Zealand trade objective for more than a
decade." Id.
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TPP, however, New Zealand has largely received the "cold shoulder."54
In any case, New Zealand's market is only four million people and is
already highly liberalized,55 so it is evident that New Zealand is not the
driver. That leaves the small state of Brunei, which is also an unlikely
driving force behind the United States' interest.
The United States clearly sees opportunities beyond the eight cur-
rent parties, and hopes that more countries will join the TPP. Although
the current TPP partners are not major trading partners of the United
States, APEC as a whole represents a huge market.56 Therefore, the TPP
makes a good deal of strategic sense for the United States so long as it
continues to expand. Nevertheless, the reasons go beyond the long-
term economic potential of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific; the
reasons also include a significant geopolitical component. In particular,
the United States has the potential to alter some of the economic pow-
er dynamics in the Asia-Pacific, which is consistent with President Ob-
ama's stated goals of increased U.S. engagement in the region.
At a major address in Japan in November 2009, President Obama
promised increased U.S. engagement in all aspects of its relations with
countries in the Asia-Pacific, proclaiming that he would be "America's
first Pacific president" and announcing that the United States would
participate in negotiations to join the TPP.5 7 To its credit, the Obama
Administration appears to recognize the strategic significance the TPP
could have for the United States-although USTR officials deny the
agreement has any purpose other than an economic one-and is pre-
sumably pursuing the TPP for these additional reasons.
54 SeeJames M. McCormick, The New Zealand-United States Relationship in the Era of Glo-
balization, in SOVEREIGNTY UNDER SEIGE? GLOBALIZATION & NEW ZEALAND 213, 216 (Ro-
bert Patman & Chris Rudd eds., 2005). In the past, the United States objected to any sug-
gestion of a free trade agreement with New Zealand because New Zealand refuses to allow
United States' nuclear ships into its territorial waters. See id. In recent years, however, the
United States has softened its stance towards New Zealand with respect to this issue. None-
theless, with a market of only four million people, a highly liberalized economy that is
open to United States products, and a competitive dairy export sector, it is likely that the
United States sees few potential gains from an FTA with New Zealand. See id. at 217.
55 See id.
56 See OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2009 TRADE POL-
Icy AGENDA AND 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 123-24 [hereinafter 2008 REPORT]. In 2008, the United
States traded $2.1 trillion in goods, and $287 billion in services, with APEC. See McCor-
mick, supra note 54, at 217.
57 See President Barack Obama, Remarks at Suntory Hall (Nov. 14, 2009, 10:12 AM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-brack-obama-suntory-hall.
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II. IMPLICATIONS OF TPP EXPANSION FOR (BOTH SIDES OF) THE PACIFIC
A. Implications for the United States
Twenty years ago, then-Secretary of State James Baker famously
cautioned that it would be a mistake for the United States to permit "a
line to be drawn down the middle of the Pacific" with the United States
on one side, separated from Asian countries on the other.58 Notwith-
standing this warning, we have seen numerous models for economic
integration in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific that exclude the United
States from their formulations. ASEAN + 3, ASEAN + 6, and an East
Asian FTA comprising Japan, Korea, and China, are all different visions
for deeper regional economic integration, and each has deliberately
omitted the United States from the equation.59 If the United States
could succeed in negotiating the TPP-and additionally succeed in sell-
ing the TPP as the basis for broader expansion within APEC-it could
represent a major step toward achieving President Obama's goal of en-
gaging with Asia,60 and would erase the line down the middle of the Pa-
cific, which China,61 Japan,62 and perhaps others, might prefer to draw.63
An expanded TPP could lead to a different path toward Asian
economic integration, which would have neither ASEAN nor the three
58 SeeJeffrey Bader, Special Assistant to the President, National Security Council, Ad-
dress at the Brookings Institution, Obama Goes to Asia: Understanding the President's
Trip, 47 (Nov. 6, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/
events/2009/1106_obama_asia/20091106_obamaasiatrip.pdf); Claude Barfield, APEC:
The Keystone to U.S. Asian Policy, THE AMERICAN (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.american.
com/archive/2009/november/apec-the-keystone-to-u-s-asian-policy/article-print.
5 Lewis, supra note 1, at 408-09. For a more detailed analysis of the competing re-
gional economic models, see id. at 408-13.
6o See Evan A. Feigenbaum, America, Trade, and Asia, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
(May 14, 2010, 2:12 PM), http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2010/05/14/america-trade-and-asia/
(characterizing the TPP as a "modest effort" that will not be sufficient to restore the Unit-
ed States' historical economic role in Asia). Some, however, doubt whether the TPP will
significantly enhance the United States' position in Asia. See id.
61 See Claude Barfield & Philip I. Levy, Tales of the South Pacific: President Obama and the
Transpacific Partnership, INT'L ECON. OUTLOOK, Dec. 2009, at 4, available at http://www.
aei.org/docLib/09-IEO-Dec-g.pdf (suggesting that China appears to prefer the ASEAN +
3 model to an APEC formulation because APEC includes the United States and Taiwan).
62 Id. at 7 (noting that Japan's Prime Minister, Ylikio Hatoyama, has advocated for an
East Asian Community that would appear to exclude the United States).
63 See Association of Southeast Asian Nations, The 23rd ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting,
para. 3 (Oct. 7-8, 1991), available at http://www.aseansec.org/6126.htm. This Asia-only focus
is nothing new. Originally promoted by Malaysia's then-Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir,
the idea of an East Asian economic grouping that would exclude the United States has been
around for the past two decades. See C. Fred Bergsten, The NAew Asian Challenge, INST. FOR
INT'L ECON., at 2-3 (Mar. 2000), available at http://iie.com/publications/wp/00-4.pdf.
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major East Asian economies as its driver, and which would instead have
the United States as a central participant. 64
If the expanded TPP becomes the basis for a Free Trade Area of
the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), Asian integration will likely develop along
lines more similar to those envisioned (even if primarily in an aspira-
tional sense) by the members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) than those being contemplated in the context of ASEAN-plus
arrangements or an East Asian FTA. In particular, an expanded TPP
would lead to a trans-Pacific integration rather than an intra-Asian in-
tegration.
The United States' decision to negotiate to join the TPP is there-
fore quite savvy. By joining the TPP, the United States has the potential
not only to thwart efforts to shape Asian economic regionalism models
that exclude it, but, if the TPP expansion is successful and continues,
the United States will also be a leader and agenda-setter with respect to
the parameters of a future FTAAP. Further, if the TPP grows into an
FTAAP, the global economic order would also be altered. At present
there are three major economic blocs-the Americas, Europe, and
Asia-and the American bloc is not necessarily the most economically
powerful among these.65 An Asia-Pacific integration has the potential to
alter the balance into a two-bloc model comprising Europe and the
Asia-Pacific, with the latter including Asia, the United States, Oceania,
and much of South America. Therefore, joining the TPP could help
the United States play an active role in altering the regional power bal-
ance, thereby inserting itself into what is likely to be the more powerful
of two large blocs as opposed to remaining on the wrong side of a di-
vided Pacific.
Depending on how the expansion is structured, the TPP addition-
ally has the potential to multilateralize some aspects of regionalism,66
64 Claude Barfield & Philip I. Levy, Tales of the South Pacific: President Obama, the Trans-
Pacific Partnership and U.S. Leadership in Asia, Vox (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.voxeu.org/
index.php?q=node/4533 (arguing that the TPP is an ideal mechanism for the United
States to assert leadership in the creation of a new, inclusive Asian architecture).
65 SeeJohn Ravenhill, A Three Bloc World? The New East Asian Regionalism, 2 INT'L RELA-
TIONS OF THE ASIA PAC. 167, 170 (2002).
6 See Ann Capling, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, EAST ASIA FORUM (Nov. 23, 2009),
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/11/23/the-trans-pacific-partnership/. Multilateralizing
regionalism is an important goal, as it could counteract the fragmenting effects of the hun-
dreds of FTAs currently in existence or being negotiated. Richard Baldwin et al., Beyond Tar-
iffs: Multilateralizing Non-Tariff RTA Commitments, in MULTI-LATERALIZING REGIONALISM:
CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYsTEMI 79-80 (Richard Baldwin & Patrick Lows,
eds., 2009). This has been the subject of at least one conference: the Conference on Multilat-
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which would help facilitate the creation of an FTAAP. In other words,
the famous "spaghetti bowl"67 of overlapping and inconsistent FTAs
proliferating the globe could be partially untangled if a large group of
countries could agree to a harmonized set of commitments to which
other countries could accede. 68 The TPP-and ultimately an FTAAP-
has the potential to serve as a model of open regionalism69 and a step-
ping stone toward multilateral trade liberalization, rather than the
stumbling block that FTAs more commonly present. 70
By combining a high-standards, comprehensive trade agreement
with an open accession provision and the United States as a party, the
TPP has the potential to create a new paradigm for trade agreements.
Rather than presenting the usual two country model in which both
countries pick and choose the areas they wish to liberalize, the TPP
would draw together multiple countries from both sides of the Pacific.
The TPP has the potential to be far more comprehensive than the aver-
age FTA. With the United States as a party, other countries will be inter-
ested in joining the TPP, and doing so would require significant liberali-
zation commitments. If the TPP were negotiated on these terms, it is
possible-perhaps even likely-that the TPP would lead to an FTAAP.
eralizing Regionalism, September 10-12, 2007 in Geneva, Switzerland, along with an associ-
ated collection of scholarly articles. See MULTI-LATERALIZING REGIONALISM, supra, at xiv.
67 SeeJAGDIsH BHAGWATI, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas, in THE
DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 2, 2-3 (AEI Press, 1995). This
description of FTAs was coined byJagdish Bhagwati. The spaghetti bowl imagery is used in
particular to refer to the fact that different agreements apply different rules of origin
(ROO), resulting in a highly challenging situation for would-be exporters, as they may find
they need to comply with rules that are inconsistent from one importing country to an-
other. Id. at 3. Inconsistent rules of origin are further fragmenting the world trading sys-
tem; nevertheless, getting the WTO membership to agree to adopt a single, harmonized
ROO system has not yet been possible. See generally Won-Mog Choi, Defragmenting Frag-
mented Rules of Origin of RTAs: A Building Block to Global Free Trade, 13 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 111
(2010) (providing an analysis of ROO issues in global free trade).
68 SeeJohn Ravenhill, Can the TPP Resolve the Woodle Bowl'Problem?, EAST ASIA FORUM
(Nov. 26, 2009), http://eastasiaforum.org/2009/11/26/can-the-tpp-resolve-the-noodle-
bowl-problem/ (noting that if TPP expansion were successful, the agreement would have
the potential to multilateralize the free trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region).
6 Barfield & Levy, supra note 64 (describing the TPP as a potential model of open re-
gionalism).
70 See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, TERMITES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM: How PREFERENTIAL
AGREEMENTS UNDERMINE FREE TRADE 81-88 (2008); Matthew Schaefer, Ensuring That
Regional Trade Agreements Complement the WTO System: U.S. Unilateralism a Supplement to W70
Initiatives?, 10J. INT'L EcoN. L. 585, 586 n.4 (2007).
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B. Inplications for the WTO
If the TPP does expand in the near ftiture into a larger agreement
that captures a significant percentage of trans-Pacific trade, it may im-
pact the ability of WTO members to complete the current Doha Round
of negotiations. 71 The nature of this impact could be negative because
the United States and other TPP members could determine that ex-
panding the TPP is an easier and more fruitful path towards new trade
liberalization gains than is the multilateral framework. On the other
hand, the growth of the TPP could have a positive impact on the Doha
Round. USTR Ron Kirk has indicated that he believes the TPP will
complement the WTO negotiations. 72 Although Kirk did not explain
his comment, it seems feasible that he is correct. Countries that are not
currently a part of the TPP discussions may fear that the world is split-
ting into large trading blocs from which they are currently excluded,
and thus be incentivized to reinvigorate the Doha Round. In particular,
India and Brazil may determine it is worth giving additional WTO con-
cessions to refocus the United States on the WTO.
III. POTENTIAL PITFALLS FOR THE TPP
Although the USTR appears to be enthusiastically pursuing the
TPP, and the other countries involved in the agreement seem to be si-
milarly motivated, TPP expansion is far from guaranteed. There are a
number of issues that must be resolved before an expanded TPP can
become a reality. These issues comprise substantive obstacles in the ne-
gotiating process as well as procedural hurdles that must be addressed
once an agreement is reached. Moreover, these issues will significantly
affect whether the TPP will multilateralize trade among APEC mem-
bers, ultimately leading to an FTAAP. Although some scholars have
suggested that the United States should conclude the TPP negotiations
by the time it hosts the APEC summit in November 2011,73 this may be
optimistic given the issues that must be resolved.
n See Doug Palmer, Asia Pacific Talks No Threat to DOHA: USTR Kirk, REUTERS, Dec. 15,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5BE4BD20091215.
72 Id.
' See C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ., Speech at the Seventh Annual U.S.
Asia Pacific Council Panel Discussion: Should APEC Focus on Trade Liberalization? (May 6,
2010) (transcript available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?Research
ID-1600).
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A. Substantive Negotiating Challenges
In most EFTA negotiations there are a number of issues relating to
substantive coverage that pose challenges to resolve. Although each
partner stands to benefit from the market access liberalization meas-
ures taken by the trading partner, each partner in turn faces domestic
opposition to liberalizing its home market for goods and services pro-
duced or supplied domestically.74 The P-4 Agreement was relatively
unique in being able to overcome some of these obstacles and achieve
a highly comprehensive agreement, at least with respect to trade in
goods.75 With the addition of the United States, however, the TPP ne-
gotiations are more typical of many bilateral FTA negotiations. 76 Ac-
cordingly, there are a number of potential issues regarding substantive
matters within the negotiation. This section briefly discusses two of
these issues: agriculture and intellectual property.
1. Agriculture
The United States has historically refused to liberalize most aspects
of trade in agriculture in its FTAs," yet the P-4 countries have agreed to
comprehensive removal of tariffs on agricultural products.78 How much
of its agricultural sector the United States will be willing to include in
its TPP commitments, is likely to be a significant issue. Roughly half of
New Zealand's exports to the United States are agricultural products
that the United States considers sensitive: primarily dairy, lamb, and
7 See David A. Gantz, The "Bipartisan Trade Deal," Trade Promotion Authority and the Fu-
ture of U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 28 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 115, 118 (2008); C. O'Neal
Taylor, Regionalism: The Second-Best Option?, 28 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 155, 173-74
(2008). Both articles were published as part of a symposium entitled, "The Changing Tide
of Trade: The Social, Political, and Environmental Implications of Regional Trade Agree-
ments," hosted by the St. Louis University Public Laow Review.
7 See Deborah K. Elms, From the P4 to the TPP: Explaining Expansion Interests in the
Asia-Pacific, at 6 (United Nations Econ. & Soc. Comm'n for Asia & the Pacific, Conference
Paper, Asia-Pacific Trade Economists' Conference, 2009), available at http://www.unescap.
org/tid/artnet/mtg/Deborah%20Ems.pdf.
76 SeeRavenhill, supra note 51, at 25.
n See Taylor, supra note 74, at 188. At the same time, the United States often insists on
agricultural market access concessions from its trading partners. For example, the Korea-
United States FTA is unlikely to be presented to Congress until Korea makes new conces-
sions on access to its market for U.S. beef. See Gantz, supra note 74, at 147-48. For a discus-
sion of the general tendency to exclude agriculture from FTAs, see Schaefer, supra note 70,
at 588-89.
7a See Elms, supra note 75, at 23 n.71. Chile only committed to removing tariffs imme-
diately on a subset of New Zealand's dairy exports. The remaining Chilean tariffs are sub-
ject to a twelve year phase-out period. See id.
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beef.79 The U.S. dairy industry has already reacted with alarm to the
idea of an agreement that could involve New Zealand dairy products
gaining improved access to the U.S. market, and thirty senators signed
a letter to USTR Ron Kirk expressing concern in this regard."
For New Zealand, excluding dairy from the agreement would be a
very hard sell. Nevertheless, New Zealand has very little to offer the
United States in exchange for including dairy. In fact, the United States
may have little to gain from forming an alliance with New Zealand. The
New Zealand market is already highly liberalized, so there would be
only minimal gains in the form of improved market access. 8 1 And New
Zealand is a small market, currently accounting for less than .05% of
U.S. exports.82 Thus, notwithstanding New Zealand's long-term goal of
achieving an FTA with the United States, it may be that New Zealand
does not have enough to offer the United States, or (admittedly less
likely) that the United States' demands will result in insufficient payoffs
for New Zealand.83
2. Intellectual Property
A second issue that may prove challenging in the negotiations is
intellectual property protection. The United States generally includes
provisions in its FIAs that are referred to as "TRIPS-plus" in that they
provide higher levels of protection than is required by the WTO's
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agree-
ment." This does not pose an issue for countries that already have
FTAs-including TRIPS-plus provisions-with the United States-such
as Australia." Nevertheless, there are aspects of the Australian-United
States Free Trade Agreement (AUSYTA) that are inconsistent with the
United States-Singapore FTA with respect to intellectual property
protection. For example, the United States-Singapore agreement
does not prohibit the practice of parallel importation, whereas the
AUSFTA does prohibit parallel importation.?
7 Ravenhill, supra note 51, at 25.
8 See Dustin Ensinger, TPP Could Cost U.S. Dairy Farmers Billions, EcONOMY IN CRISIS
(Mar. 23, 2010, 2:10 PM), http://www.economyincrisis.org/content/tpp-could-cost-us-dair-
farmers-billions.
81 See id.
82 Ravenhill, supra note 51, at 25.
8 See Elms, supra note 75, at 22-25.
8 See BHAGWATI, supra note 70, at 95.
8 See id. at 80.
8 See U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement art. 17.9(4), U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/australia/asset-up-
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For a small market economy such as New Zealand, permitting par-
allel imports makes good economic sense; indeed, New Zealand allows
parallel imports in its domestic law and has yet to agree to limit such
imports in any of its FTAs.87 Presumably the United States will want the
TPP to include provisions restricting parallel imports, which will be op-
posed at a minimum by New Zealand and Singapore. The AUSFTA also
imposes restrictions that affect how Australia purchases prescription
drugs for its public health system.88 It is likely that the United States
would want New Zealand to make similar changes, which New Zealand
would oppose.89
B. Procedural Obstacles Within the United States
Even if the USTR succeeds in reaching an agreed-upon text with
the other seven members of the proposed TPP expansion, it will still
need for Congress to enact implementing legislation.90 In the United
States, unless a treaty is self-executing, it will not become enforceable as
a matter of domestic law until it is implemented via legislation.91
Under the United States Constitution, Congress has the authority
to "regulate commerce with foreign nations."92 Nevertheless, Congress
load filel48_5168.pdf; US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement art. 16.7, May, 6, 2003, available
at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/asset-upload-
file708_4036.pdf.
87 See Elms, supra note 75, at 23 n.72; Parallel Importing in New 7aland, MINISTRY OF
ECON. DEv. (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.med.govt.nz (navigate to "Regulation" drop-down
menu; click "International Property Policy" hyperlink; navigate to "Parallel Importing";
navigate to "Parallel Importing in New Zealand").
88 See BHAGWATI, supra note 70, at 80.
89 See Elms, supra note 75, at 20 n.62. The enforcement of intellectual property rights is
also likely to be an issue. Chile, Peru, Brunei, and Vietnam have all been placed on the
United States' Special 301 watch lists based on perceived deficiencies in their domestic
enforcement regimes. See id. at 18.
9 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 48-49 (7th ed. 2008).
91 See id. This is often referred to as a dualist approach to international and domestic
law. In contrast some countries have monist systems where international legal commit-
ments are automatically incorporated into domestic law without any need for implement-
ing legislation. See id. at 31-33 (discussing monist and dualist systems). Some argue that
the United States is a dualist system; others characterize it as a hybrid of both the monist
and dualist approaches. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VAL-
UEs 71-72 (1995); Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist
Conception, 51 STAN. L. REv. 529, 531 (1999). In general, however, when a treaty has terms
that reflect the need for legislative action, it will not be treated as self-executing. This prin-
ciple was first elaborated in Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
92 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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has on numerous occasions delegated this authority to the President.93
When the President holds this authority it is referred to as "fast track
authority" or 'Trade Promotion Authority" (TPA).94 TR gives the Pres-
ident authority not only to negotiate trade agreements, but also to pre-
sent Congress with treaty text that Congress must then either accept or
reject in its entirety.95 In other words, Congress does not have the
power-when the administration is in possession of TPA-to exercise
line-item vetoes, to filibuster, or to condition acceptance of the bill on
amendments, riders, provisos, or other conditions.96
The President held TPA continuously from 1974 to 1994.97 But
following the contentiousness surrounding Congressional approval of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act of 1994-the implementing legislation for the
Marrakesh Agreement creating the WTO-Congress declined to renew
TPA for eight years.98 The majority-Republican Congress finally ended
the drought and granted the Bush administration TPA pursuant to the
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002.99 This Act, which
expired in 2007, required the administration to engage in consultations
with Congress, domestic stakeholders, and private sector advisory
committees throughout the process of negotiating trade agreements.100
In the past, U.S. administrations have succeeded in passing trade
agreements through Congress by virtue of having TPA.' 0 It is widely
recognized that in the absence of TPA, it would be extremely difficult
for any trade agreement legislation to be passed, and thus difficult for
treaties to come into effect. 0 2 Without TPA, Congress would inevitably
insist upon redrafting provisions of the agreement texts, and adding to
and subtracting from the negotiated and agreed to obligations. The
9 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-59, AN ANALYSIS OF FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS AND CONGRESSIONAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR CONSULTATIONS UNDER TRADE
PROMOTION AUTHORITY 7 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0859.pdf
(discussing history and parameters of Trade Promotion Authority); see, e.g., Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act of 1934, 43 Stat. 943 (1934) (first delegation of Congressional authority).
9 See Gantz, supra note 74, at 117.
9 See id. at 131-32.
96 See id.
9 See id. at 130-31.
98 Gonzalo Villalta Puig & Georgios Andreou Avgousti, "Ignite a New Era of Global Eco-
nomic Growth Through Free Markets and Free Trade": The Rejection of Multilateral Trade Liberalisa-
tion by the National Security Strategy of the United States (2002-2006), 16 INT'L. TRADE L. & REG.
96, 96-97 (2010).
9 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3813 (2006).
100 Id. §§ 3804, 3812.
IoI See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 93, at 9.
1o2 See Gantz, supra note 74, at 153; Taylor, supra note 74, at 162.
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other party to the agreement is unlikely to agree to renegotiate signifi-
cant portions of the treaty in response to Congress's demands. Thus as
a practical matter TPA is seen as all but necessary to get any trade
agreements enacted. 03 Indeed, the Bush administration negotiated a
number of trade agreements during its last term, including FTAs with
Korea, 104 Panama, 105 and Colombia. 106 The Panama and Colombia
agreements have not been submitted to Congress for consideration be-
cause the deals are seen as doomed in the absence of TPA.107
Although TPA is of paramount importance, Congress has been
unwilling to grant the authority since it expired in 2007.108 Moreover, it
is unlikely that Congress will grant the Obama administration TPA any
time soon. Democrats in Congress are not on the whole favorably in-
clined toward pursuing a free trade agenda, and wish to see environ-
mental and labor side agreements in any FTA.109 Additionally, in the
current political environment it is not realistic to think that Republi-
1os See Gantz, supra note 74, at 122; Taylor, supra note 74, at 162-63. But see U.S. GOv'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 93, at 9.
104 See Alan Beattie, Obama Aims to Renegotiate S Korea Trade Pact, FINANCIAL TIMES (June
26, 2010, 10:25 PM), http://journalisted.com/alan-beattie?allarticles=yes (navigate to article
title and click hyperlink; free registration required at Financial Times website) (last visited
Oct. 25, 2010). The Korea-U.S. Trade Agreement ("KORUS") is of important economic and
strategic significance for the United States' ability to be a significant player in Asian markets
and to participate in Asian economic integration efforts. See Feigenbaum, supra note 60. It is
thus troubling that KORUS has been languishing, not presented to Congress since 2007. See
id. Korea has not been sitting idly; in the interim it has negotiated an FTA with the European
Union (although this has yet to be implemented). See id.; John W. Miller, EU, Central America
Reach Trade Agreement, COSTA RICA NEWs (May 18, 2010), http://thecostaricanews.com/
eu-central-america-reach-trade-agreement/3175. The European Union has taken advantage
of the United States' failure to implement the agreements negotiated by the Bush admini-
stration, having now negotiated FTAs with all of the United States' pending FTA agreement
partners: Colombia, Panama, and Korea. See Miller, supra.
10 See Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/panama-tpa (last visited Nov.
15, 2010).
106 See Colombia FA, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/
trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
107 See Levin Argues Against Fast-Track Trade Authority, CQ PoLIrrCS (Dec. 15, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.citizenstrade.org/pdf/20091215_levinarguesagainstfasttrack-cqpolitics.pdf.
The Bush administration signed KORUS shortly before the expiration of TPA, and thus that
agreement could still be presented to Congress for an up or down vote. Nevertheless, it also
has not been submitted due to strong pressures from United States interests to renegotiate
commitments relating to market access for U.S. beef and auto parts. SeeJeffreyJ. Schott, Op-
Ed., Congress and the KORUS F7A, KOREA TIMES (Nov. 8, 2010), available at http://www.iie.
com/publications/opeds/print.cfm?researchid= 1706&doc= pub.
10s See Levin Argues Against Fast-Track Trade Authority, supra note 107.
1o9 See Beattie, supra note 104.
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cans in Congress are going to bestow any power to the Obama admini-
stration that they do not have to.
Interestingly, the USTR appears to be following the mandates of
the previous grant of TPA even though there is no current authority.
The USTR has been engaging in extensive consultations with Congress
and interested manufacturing, farming, and other interests.110 It has
held public question and answer sessions on the internet,"' and has
been very vocal in its efforts to consult with interested stakeholders.11 2
Presumably this is all part of an effort to soften Congress so that it will
ultimately grant TPA-even if only with respect to the TPP. If Congress
grants TPA after the negotiations are largely completed-and the grant
contains the same constraints on the Obama Administration that the
2002 grant contained-then the USTR has covered itself by fulfilling all
required consultations. Nonetheless, there is no guarantee Congress
will grant TPA. Accordingly, this remains a large obstacle.113
C. Disagreements over the Negotiating Architecture
An important question is whether the TPP will be structured to
serve as a model for an FTAAP, or whether it will instead be based on a
U.S. bilateral FTA model, which would be much less likely to grow into
a larger region-wide agreement.
Following the second round of negotiations in June 2010, the
USTR reported that the talks had focused on several negotiating goals,
110 19 U.S.C. § 3804 (requiring the President to consult with various Congressional
committees when negotiating free trade agreements regarding tariff and nontariff barriers);
see TPP Outreach and Updates, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.
gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-outreach-and-
updates (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (describing the USTR efforts as an "unprecedented fifty-
state domestic outreach strategy").
"I See Transcript of USTRs TPP Online Chat, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTA-
TIVE (May 21, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/blog/2010/
may/ustrs-tpp-online-chat; Transcript of TPP Question and Answer: Colombia and TPP, OF-
FICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Jun. 15, 2010, 7:06 PM), http://www.ustr.gov/
about-us/press-office/blog/2010/june/tpp-question-and-nswer-colombia-and-tpp; Transcript
of TPP Question and Answer: Customs, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Jun. 18,
2010, 5:21 PM), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/blog/2010/june/tpp-question-
and-answer-customs; Transcript of TPP Question and Answer: Legal Services, OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Jun. 17, 2010, 1:30 PM), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/
press-office/blog/2010/june/tpp-question-and-answer-legal-services.
"1 SeeTranscript of USTR's TPP Online Chat, supra note 111.
us See J.F. HORNBECK & WVILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RI 33743,
TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA): ISSUES, OPTIONS, AND PROSPECTS FOR RENEWAL
21-22 (2008) (positing that if Congress elected to grant TPA, it could do so for the limited
purpose of implementing a completed WYTO Doha Round set of negotiations).
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including "determining the architecture for market access negotia-
tions.""4 This determination will significantly impact the nature of any
final agreement, and the future attractiveness of the TPP to other
countries.
"Determining the architecture for market access negotiations" re-
fers to a difference in approach between the United States, on the one
hand, and New Zealand, Australia, and Singapore, on the other. Exist-
ing TPP members New Zealand and Singapore, together with the Unit-
ed States' FTA partner Australia, want to negotiate a unified market ac-
cess schedule." 5 This form of schedule would entail reopening the
market access schedules within the bilateral FTAs already in place
among various TPP countries. 16 Under this system, each member would
have a single tariff schedule, with each concession applying to all TPP
members.117 The unified market access schedule approach has the ben-
efits of making it more difficult to exclude sensitive sectors and creating
an agreement that is relatively straightforward for new countries to ac-
cede to, particularly if the agreement included a uniform approach to
Rules of Origin (ROO).118 This approach would also allow TPP mem-
bers to revisit the exclusions agreed to in their bilateral agreements. For
example, if the approach shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Singa-
pore were adopted, Australia would have an opportunity to attempt to
negotiate to have the TPP include sugar.119 Thus, adopting a unified
market access schedule would lead to a more comprehensive and uni-
form agreement than the United States' preferred alternative.
Instead, the United States has taken the position that its negotia-
tions should be on a bilateral basis with the TPP players with which it
does not currently have FTAs: namely, New Zealand, Vietnam, and
Brunei. Additionally, the United States has maintained that for those
countries with which it currently has FT~s the terms of those FTAs
should apply in the TPP context. 120 This would mean that the market
114 Press Release, supra note 7.
115 See TPP Negotiators to Seek Market Access Structure Deal at August Meeting, 28 Inside U.S.
Trade Online (Inside Wash. Publishers) (June 25, 2010), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-
US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-06/25/2010/tpp-negotiators-to-seek-market-ccess-structure-
deal-at-august-meeting/menu-id-710.html.
116 See id.
117 See TPP Negotiators Unable to Reach Consensus on Key Structural Issues, 28 Inside U.S. Trade
Online (Inside Wash. Publishers) (June 18, 2010), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/
Inside-U.S.-Trade-06/18/2010/tpp-negotiatorsmable-to-reach-consensus-n-key-structural-issues/
menu-id-710.htrml.
118 See id.
119 See id.
1o See TPP Negotiators to Seek Market Access Structure Deal at August Meeting, supra note 115.
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access schedules in the bilateral agreements would not be reopened
but would instead be kept intact within the TPP.121 Such an approach
would have significant ramifications for the participating countries. For
Australia, it would mean that the United States-required carve out of
sugar in the AUSFTA would remain in effect. 122 For New Zealand, it
would almost certainly mean having to agree to exclusions-or at a
minimum very long phase-ins-for dairy products.' 23 This is in stark
contrast to the extant TPP agreement, which provided for the majority
of tariffs to be removed entirely upon the TPP's entry into force, and
for any remaining tariffs to be reduced to zero by 2017.124 Indeed, in
general, the United States' proposed approach would likely lead to a
lower level of market access than if the negotiations began from the
standpoint of creating an across-the-board high-standards agreement.
This approach would probably make other countries less likely to
want to join the TPP agreement. It is easier to negotiate to join a single
agreement than to have to negotiate separate bilateral arrangements
with each partner.125 Ironically, the United States' negotiating stance
will make it less likely to achieve its goal of forming an agreement that
will expand into an APEC-wide FTA. In fact, what would arguably exist
under the U.S. approach would not be a single unified FTA, but rather
a series of spoke-and-wheel bilateral arrangements existing under a ve-
neer of commonality.'26
In the context of multiple bilateral negotiations, one has to worry
that the United States will not pursue the "high-standard, comprehen-
sive agreement"127 it purports to desire, but will instead succumb to
domestic pressures and seek significant exclusions from some of the
bilateral relationships. Indeed, the likely outcome if the United States
121 See id.
122 See TPP Countries Examining New Compromise Idea For Market Access Talks, 28 Inside U.S.
Trade Online (Inside Wash. Publishers) (Aug. 6, 2010), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-
Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-08/06/2010/tpp-countries-examining-new-compromise-idea-for-
market-access-talks/menu-id-710.html.
123 See id.
124 See N.Z. MFAT 2005 REPORT, supra note 23.
125 See TPP Negotiators to Seek Maret Access Structure Deal at August Mecting, supra note
115 (noting that the parties have recently agreed that all of the FJAs currently in effect
among the TPP parties should co-exist alongside the TPP).
126 See Ann Capling, supra note 36 (suggesting that an expanded TPP might not be a
genuine region-wide agreement).
127 USTR Fact Sheet: Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 10 ("The United States will en-
gage with an initial group of seven like-minded countries ... to craft a platform for a high-
standard, comprehensive agreement--one that reflects U.S. priorities and values-with
these and additional Asia-Pacific partners.").
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approach prevails is that the United States will negotiate bilateral
agreements with New Zealand, Vietnam, and Brunei that are modeled
on previous U.S. FTAs.128
In a recent report on trade agreements, the Government Account-
ability Office notes that "[o]ther countries that negotiate FTAs fre-
quently exclude sensitive industries or issues. Some trade experts argued
that USTR's pursuit of comprehensive agreements limits potential FTA
partners since a number of larger economies are unwilling to enter into
such comprehensive negotiations."1 29 Although this is undoubtedly ac-
curate-for example, it would be difficult for the United States to
achieve an FTA with Japan because of the exclusions Japan would pre-
sumably demand-it is equally true of the United States, which gener-
ally insists upon exclusions-or at a minimum, lengthy implementation
periods-for various agricultural products.o30 Therefore, it may well be
that the TPP will merely appear on the surface to be a new paradigm,
but will in fact represent business as usual. This would be a mistake on
the United States' part. Although it would be the easier negotiating path
for the United States, it would be far less likely to achieve the strategic
goals that made the TPP an attractive proposition in the first place.
For the TPP to serve as a model for a future FTAAP, it will have to
be an agreement that other countries are interested in joining. The
TPP agreement is not the only option available for Asia-Pacific regional-
ism, and if the TPP is not sufficiently attractive, one of the other visions
for regional economic integration may instead fill the role as FTAAP
model. China would like to see ASEAN + 3 serve this function, particu-
larly because it would exclude the United States.131 Japan prefers
128 See TPP Countries Examining New Compromise Idea for Market Access Talks, supra note
122; see also Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Free Trade Agreement Paradox, 21 N.Z. UNIv. L. REV.
554, 564-65 (2005). In the case of New Zealand, the AUSFTA is the most likely model,
both because it is relatively recent and because this is the liberalization benchmark New
Zealand would likely seek, as its export portfolio is similar to Australia's in a number of
respects. Lewis, supra, at 564. Although not nearly as ambitious or desirable as an agree-
ment that fully liberalizes trade in goods, New Zealand would at least be brought back
onto an even footing with Australia in competing in the United States market. Id. at 564.
This recalibrating of comparative advantage-sometimes called domino regionalism or the
"me too" effect-is often a motivation for entering into FTAs. Id. at 564-65.
1'9 Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 93, at 18.
13 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement annex 703.3, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec.
17, 1992, available at http://ww.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?x = 343&mtpilD =ALL
(United States claiming special safeguard goods exempt from tariff reduction, including
tomatoes, onions, shallots, eggplants, "chili" peppers, squash, and watermelon).
I31 See Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: A Chinese "Monroe Doc-
trine" or "Peaceful Rise"?, CHINA BRIEF, Aug. 20, 2009, at 9, 10-11 (discussing China's trade
liberalization and economic development in Southeast Asia).
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ASEAN + 6 because it would include more economies to counterbal-
ance China, and would still exclude the United States.132 The TPP
needs to be more attractive to potential partners than ASEAN + 3,
ASEAN + 6, or any other potential regional models. If the TPP is clean-
er and more comprehensive, it will be a more attractive model because
it will be relatively simple to incorporate other countries into the part-
nership. On the other hand, if bilateral agreements must be negotiated
between every set of partners that do not already have a bilateral FTA,
the negotiations will be highly burdensome and the outcomes will be
less attractive. Thus the United States' approach in the June negotia-
tions is worrisome, and suggests that the USTR does not have a clear
idea of what its negotiation goals are, or should be.133
More recently, the United States has signaled it may be willing to
compromise on this important negotiating issue. Following the June
negotiations, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore have continued, in
informal discussions, to push for multilateral market access negotia-
tions.134 Sources indicate that the parties are now searching for a middle
ground, and that there is disagreement within the USTR regarding the
best approach to pursue.135 Reports from the subsequent round of in-
tercessional talks in Peru are that this issue remains unresolved.136
Hopefully USTR officials will reach agreement and recognize that a sig-
nificant value of the TPP would be that it provides a leadership role for
the United States in an Asia-Pacific economic integration agreement,
and that this role is unlikely to materialize if the TPP is merely an as-
semblage of bilateral agreements that are insufficiently comprehensive.
CONCLUSION
The Obama administration is wise to negotiate for a Trans-Pacific
Partnership. Such an agreement has the potential to re-assert the Unit-
ed States' position as a leader and economic participant on both sides
of the Pacific. It also represents the best chance, among the options
otherwise in play, for the United States to play a role in shaping a fu-
ture Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FFAAP). The TPP agreement
has the potential to act as a building block toward further liberalization,
132 Masahiro Kawai Dean & Ganeshan Wignaraja, ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+ 6: Which Way
Forward?, AsIAN DEV. BANK INST., at 10 (ADBI Discussion Paper No. 77, 2007), available at
http://ww.wto.org/english/tratope/region-e/con-sep07_e/kawai-wignaraja-e.pdf.
1ss See TPP Negotiators to Seek Market Access Structure Deal at August Meeting, supra note 115.
134 See TPP Countries Examining New Compromise Idea for Market Access Talks, supra note 122.
135 See id.
136 See TPP Members Examine Proposals in Peru, Do Not Reach Final Ageements, supra note 7.
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and to multilateralize some of the fragmentation resulting from the
panoply of FTAs today.
If a TPP agreement is reached in the form of one unified agree-
ment with common market access schedules, it will have a greater po-
tential to attract more participants and meaningfully reduce trade bar-
riers among a growing circle of nations. Nevertheless, there is a
significant risk that the TPP will not live up to its potential. The more
the TPP looks like a series of bilateral U.S. FTAs with exclusions for
products the United States considers sensitive, the less likely the TPP
will attract other countries to accede. Thus, the United States must
carefully assess its goals for the TPP. Moreover, the United States must
be careful not to shoot itself in the foot by following a "business as
usual" approach, if it truly intends to create a high-standards agree-
ment that will be a model for an FTAAP. The traditional U.S. FTA
model is not as likely as the model advocated by Australia, New Zea-
land, and Singapore, to achieve the result the USTR claims to be pursu-
ing. Nonetheless, it will be surprising if the United States agrees to di-
verge from its previous negotiating strategies and assent to the model
advocated by Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore.
There are a number of impediments that may torpedo the TPP
agreement before it is concluded, and other factors that could render
any agreement of no more significance than any other U.S. FTA. Never-
theless, the TPP agreement has the potential to become a new paradigm
for trade agreements, to help the United States re-assert its position in
the Asia-Pacific, and to begin the process of defragmenting interna-
tional trade. The potential payoffs are significant and important:
hopefully the United States can resist the temptation to pursue "busi-
ness as usual" -an approach that would actually undermine its strategic
objectives-and instead take the necessary steps to achieve those goals.
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